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The International Court of Justice (Court or ICJ) delivered three judgments in 2015. The first, 
delivered on 3 February, determines claims of genocide made by Croatia and Serbia against 
each other. The second, delivered on 24 September, addresses Chile’s preliminary objections 
in a case brought by Bolivia claiming violation of an obligation to negotiate in good faith in 
order to secure Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific. The third, delivered on 16 
December, concerns the joined cases brought by Costa Rica and Nicaragua against each 
other, alleging territorial violations and transboundary environmental harms. This review 
highlights notable points of interest in the judgments, and draws attention to particular 
insights and critiques afforded by the several individual opinions that accompany each 
judgment.  
 
I. THE COURT’S JUDICIAL ACTIVITY 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Croatia v. Serbia) 
The judgment in Croatia v. Serbia marks the end of a long list of ICJ cases arising from 
violence, displacement, and other issues in the disintegration and eventual dissolution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY).
1
 This case concerned claims of genocide 
made by each party against the other. Croatia instituted an application in 1999, invoking the 
jurisdictional clause of the Genocide Convention, Article IX.
2
 It alleged that Serbia was 
responsible for several violations of that Convention, including commission, conspiracy, 
attempt, and complicity in genocide against Croats, and failures to prevent and punish 
genocide.
3
 Croatia’s claims focused on the period between mid-1991 and mid-1992. Serbia 
advanced its counter-claim in December 2009, following the decision on its preliminary 
objections.
4
 Serbia alleged that Croatia had committed, conspired in, and failed to prevent 
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and punish acts of genocide against Serbs living in the Krajina region of Croatia in and 
around August 1995.
5
 The Court in 2015 dismissed both sets of claims on the merits.   
The factual context for the claims is well known. In the early 1990s, following economic 
crises and ethnic tensions in the SFRY, the republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina all declared independence. The remaining republics, Serbia and 
Montenegro, calling themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), adopted a 
declaration on 27 April 1992, claiming that the FRY, as the continuator of the ‘international 
legal and political personality’ of the SFRY, would ‘strictly abide’ by all the international 
commitments assumed by the SFRY, and would remain bound ‘by all obligations to 
international organizations and institutions whose member it is…’
6
 The Yugoslav Permanent 
Mission to the United Nations sent a Note to the UN Secretary General on the same date, 
reiterating that as the continuator of the SFRY, the FRY would ‘continue to fulfil all the 
rights conferred to, and obligations assumed by, the [SFRY] in international relations, 
including its membership in all international organizations and participation in international 
treaties….’
7
 The FRY’s claim of continuity with the SFRY was rejected in the UN, after a 
period of strategic ambiguity; the General Assembly and Security Council agreeing that it 
could not avail of the SFRY’s membership. However, the FRY only relinquished its claim in 
November 2000, when it agreed to be admitted to UN membership as a new state (successor 
rather than continuator to the SFRY). In the intervening period, the FRY’s status was 
regarded as sui generis,
8
 and the Court’s holdings in its respect were ‘not free from legal 
difficulties’.
9
 This is seen, for example, in the legal consequences attached to its declaration 
and Note of 27 April 1992: without accepting its claim of continuity, the Court held it bound 
by the SFRY’s treaties from that date, including the Genocide Convention (notwithstanding 
its formal accession to that treaty in 2001).
10
 The FRY changed its name to Serbia and 
Montenegro in 2003. In 2006, the two units split, with Serbia alone continuing the personality 
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While Serbia’s statehood was in this process of legal clarification, the situation on the ground 
there and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia was marked by outbursts of ethnic conflict. 
Relevant to the present case, in spring 1991 conflict broke out in the republic of Croatia, 
between Croats who sought to form an independent state, and Serbs who sought attachment 
with the republic of Serbia. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA) intervened later that year, 
officially to separate the two, but allegedly in support of the Serbs.
12
 The first phase of the 
conflict, from 1991 to summer 1992 saw the Serbs, allegedly aided by JNA, establish 
territorial control over a third of Croatian territory, including by forcibly displacing Croats. In 
summer 1995, Croatia carried out Operation Storm, recovering the same occupied territory, 
and removing Serbs from it. The two sets of claims related to the violence inflicted by the 
victorious side of each phase.  
Perhaps the most debatable feature of the present judgment is the Court’s first finding: 
dismissing Serbia’s preliminary objection that the Court’s jurisdiction did not extend to 
events prior to 27 April 1992, i.e. before the FRY had declared its existence or intention to be 
bound by the SFRY’s treaties. The Court had joined this objection to the merits stage.  
Croatia advanced several arguments against this objection. It firstly argued that because the 
Genocide Convention had been in force throughout the territory of the former SFRY prior to 
27 April 1992, its provisions could be retroactively applied to the FRY, which—in statu 
nascendi by the summer of 1991—emerged from the SFRY’s dissolution and took control of 
the SFRY’s organs. It further argued that under Article 10(2) of the Articles on State 
Responsibility (ASR),
13
 the acts of the JNA, and various Serb groups could be attributed to 
Serbia. Article 10(2) provides: 
The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a 
new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its 
administration shall be considered an act of the new State under international law.  
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The Court rightly dismissed these two arguments. It found that the Genocide Convention did 
not have retroactive effect, and could not be applied to Serbia before it had declared itself 
bound. Serbia was not responsible under the Convention either for commission or for failure 
to prevent commission of genocide prior to 27 April 1992.
14
 Moreover, it was not responsible 
for the failure to punish acts of genocide committed prior to 27 April 1992. Croatia had 
argued that responsibility for this last omission followed from the text of the Convention—
which did not limit the temporal scope of the duty to punish—supported by the existing 
prohibition of genocide in customary international law, the erga omnes character of the 
obligation to prevent and punish genocide, and the Convention’s own object of avoiding 
impunity for genocide.
15
 The Court, however, found that neither the text of the Convention 
nor its negotiating history suggested any intention to obligate states to enact retroactive 
legislation necessary ‘to punish acts of genocide committed in the past’, before they had 
become bound by its terms.
16
  
Further, the Court held that there was no point in pursuing the argument on attribution, for 
even if the acts of the JNA and other Serb groups were found attributable to the FRY in 
accordance with Article 10(2), they could not constitute a violation of the Genocide 
Convention by the FRY at a time when it was not a party. Prior to 27 April 1992, there could 
be no question of a dispute relating to Serbia’s fulfilment of the Convention, such as to 
engage Article IX.  
The case may have ended at this point, had the Court not decided to engage Croatia’s third 
argument, introduced in oral proceedings, of Serbia’s responsibility by succession.
17
  Croatia 
argued that as acts prior to 27 April 1992 were attributable to the SFRY and breached its 
obligations under the Genocide Convention, when Serbia succeeded to those obligations on 
27 April 1992 it also succeeded to the responsibility that had been incurred for their violation. 
Croatia invoked both the general international law on state succession—particularly the 
Lighthouses Arbitration,
18
 in which a tribunal had held that the responsibility of a State might 
be transferred to a successor if that was appropriate on the facts—and the FRY’s own 
declaration and Note.  
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The Court does not permit applicants to insert new claims at oral hearings if they transform 
the subject-matter of the dispute.
19
 However, it held that Croatia’s new argument did not 
amount to a new claim, and merely supported its existing claims on Serbia’s responsibility 
and the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court also decided that Article IX of the Genocide 
Convention comprehended succession as a possible mode of responsibility. Article IX states  
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or 
fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a 
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be 
submitted to the [ICJ] at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
The Court noted that this text ‘speaks generally of the responsibility of a State, and contains 
no limitation regarding the manner in which that responsibility might be engaged’.
20
 
Whether, and in what manner responsibility might be incurred fell to be determined under the 
rules of general international law, including on interpretation, responsibility, and—now the 
Court added—state succession. In its view, the applicability of state succession to Serbia in 
respect of allegations of genocide, and even the existence of a rule of succession to 
responsibility were questions relating to the merits of the claims. They would need to be 
examined only if it were established that acts amounting to genocide had been committed, 
and were attributable to the SFRY. Deciding to address these questions in this order, the 
Court dismissed Serbia’s preliminary objections in relation to pre- 27 April 1992 events.  
The Court’s partial adoption of the succession thesis, finding that the text of Article IX could 
include state responsibility by succession if a rule of succession to responsibility were 
established in international law, but bracketing the question of whether it was indeed so 
established, was opposed by several judges.
21
 Three criticisms are especially noteworthy. 
Firstly, there is no self-evident doctrine of succession in respect of state responsibility in 
international law. To quote the most recent edition of a popular textbook, state succession ‘is 
an area of uncertainty and controversy … it is possible to take the view that not many settled 
rules have yet emerged.’
22
 Succession to state responsibility is a particularly elusive concept, 
finding no mention in the codified rules either of treaty succession or of state responsibility.
23
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The Court’s own best example of the Lighthouses Arbitration turned on Greece’s adoption of 
the unlawful act of its predecessor state.
24
 In other cases too, the assumption of responsibility 
by the successor state has constituted the material factor.
25
 A doctrine of succession to 
responsibility may well be desirable to close accountability gaps arising from the actions of a 
formally extinct state (as Croatia posited). But that is different from asserting that it exists. 
The Court should have discussed the evidence in support of this doctrine, and its applicability 
in 1992, at the date of Serbia’s succession to the SFRY.
26
 Its decision to postpone 
consideration of these issues until after a determination of the merits of the genocide claims 
may have served the cause of judicial economy, but—coupled with its omission to return to 
them—means that it based its jurisdiction on a doctrine of dubious status, which it ultimately 
failed to clarify.  
Secondly, the Court erred in placing succession at par with attribution as means of incurring 
responsibility under the Genocide Convention. In fact, as President Tomka shows by 
reference to the Convention’s text and travaux préparatoires, it does not contemplate 
responsibility by succession.
27
 The Court contented itself with noting the general wording of 
Article IX. But its summary disposal of the point, without the careful analysis of text and 
negotiating history that it undertook on other points, does not sufficiently answer President 
Tomka’s challenge that a limitation as to responsibility by succession is indicated in both.  
Thirdly, the Court relied on the doctrine of succession to overcome the fact that part of its 
evaluation on the merits concerned the conduct of a third state, the former SFRY, which was 
not a party to the dispute. There is no provision for such an adjudication in Article IX. Its 
language should not be taken to suggest that states may submit disputes relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Convention by a third state;
28
 such an 
interpretation could open the way to the adjudication of a state’s responsibility without its 
consent. The Court side-stepped the point by arguing the non-applicability of the Monetary 
Gold principle to the case of a state which has ceased to exist.
29
 (And on merits it did not find 
SFRY responsible for genocide). But it did not consider the incongruity of a situation in 
which it may have found for the SFRY’s responsibility, but not for the FRY’s succession to 
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the same. There, in effect, it would have ruled on the conduct of a third party, without 
proving the necessary link with the responsibility of the respondent.  
Moreover, a finding in favour of Serbia’s responsibility by succession could have 
implications for the other successor states to the SFRY.
30
 There was no prior understanding 
that Serbia would be the sole successor to the SFRY’s responsibility; indeed, by an 
‘Agreement on Succession Issues’, the former Yugoslavian republics had deferred such 
questions to a joint committee.
31
 Would not then the Monetary Gold principle apply – or at 
least bear consideration as to its application – with respect to the other successor states?  
A number of judges noted that Croatia’s third argument, although framed in terms of state 
succession, implicitly relied upon the continuity between the FRY and the SFRY, which 
Croatia had strongly rejected in the past.
32
 And the manner of the Court’s uptake of this 
argument, without a full discussion of the above issues relating to responsibility by 
succession, does not dispel the perception that questions of Serbia’s status were once again 
treated with greater consideration to political expediency than legal principle.  
Fortunately, this judgment brings that line of cases to a close.
33
 Moreover, the facts are so 
particular that the Court’s application of Article IX is unlikely to have much impact on other 
cases concerning the scope of that provision.
34
 Rather – and hearteningly – the judgment’s 
impact might be that of prompting greater reflection on the status in international law of a 
doctrine of succession to state responsibility, leading eventually to clarification of the same.  
Turning to the merits claims, the Court found that although some of the acts cited by each 
party satisfied the actus reus of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention, the 
requirement of an accompanying mental intent, or dolus specialis, was not satisfied. In doing 
so it added little to its previous jurisprudence. The parties raised specific contentions with 
respect to the criteria for evaluating actus reus and dolus specialis, and the Court settled these 
by reiterating its approach in the Bosnian Genocide case.
35
 Those portions of the judgment 
make useful reading mainly as a succinct account of the Court’s interpretation of the concept 
of genocide provided in the Genocide Convention. Perhaps it went a step beyond previous 
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jurisprudence in its comments on disappeared persons. The Court accepted Croatia’s 
argument that ‘the psychological pain suffered by the relatives of individuals who have 
disappeared in the context of an alleged genocide, as a result of the persistent refusal of the 
competent authorities to provide the information in their possession which would enable 
these relatives to establish with certainty whether and how the persons concerned died’, could 
constitute such serious mental harm as to as to contribute to the physical or biological 
destruction of the group, thereby falling within the definition of genocide.
36
 While it did not 
find such a degree of suffering established on the facts, it encouraged both States to cooperate 
and use all available measures ‘in order that the … fate of missing persons [on both sides] 
can be settled as quickly as possible.’
37
 
Another helpful point was the clarification that, in the absence of a specific plan, the Court 
will infer dolus specialis if that is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from a pattern of 
conduct.
38
 In the Bosnian Genocide case the Court had appeared to suggest that it would infer 
genocide if that were the only possible inference to be drawn.
39
 However the Court here 
clarified that the change of language did not indicate a change of standard, for the notion of 
reasonableness was implicit in that previous judgment.  
The Court further offered an interesting discussion on the burden, standard and methods of 
proof. Much of this was again a reiteration of previous jurisprudence. However, perhaps 
catalysed by specific questions on the probative weight to be given to different categories of 
witness evidence, and on the admissibility of unsigned statements in Croatian courts, asked 
by Judges Bhandari and Greenwood,
40
 the judgment offered a helpful elaboration of how the 
Court treats different types of witness testimony.
41
 Whether the Court faithfully applied its 
stated standard of proof is a different matter—one raised by Judge Donoghue in her separate 
opinion.
42
 Nevertheless, greater clarity from the Court on such points is to be welcomed.  
The case provided further opportunity for the Court to articulate its relationship with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (and by extension other 
such institutions). The Court affirmed that it regarded the ICTY’s factual findings as ‘highly 
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persuasive’ and gave due weight to the Tribunal’s evaluations based on the facts, ‘for 
instance about the existence of the required intent’.
43
 Nevertheless, some judges, and Serbia, 
suggested interesting variations on the use that the Court might make of the ICTY’s work.  
Judge Sebutinde questioned the Court’s attaching of significance to the ICTY Prosecutor’s 
decision to exclude or withdraw charges of genocide from an indictment.
44
 She pointed out 
that such decisions were discretionary, and could be made for many reasons other than the 
probity of the charges. Moreover, the lack of proceedings in respect of the criminal 
responsibility of individuals could not be determinative of state responsibility. These are 
good points, and although the absence of genocide charges at the ICTY was only one of the 
factors relied upon by the Court, there may be an argument for it to reconsider whether and in 
what circumstances it will attach weight to prosecutorial discretion exercised at international 
criminal tribunals.  
Judge Skotnikov made almost the opposite suggestion that the Court, being ill-equipped to 
make factual findings, should wholly rely on relevant proceedings at the ICTY.
45
 That is, the 
factual determination should be entirely outsourced, given a suitable international penal 
tribunal, leaving to the Court only such questions as attribution and state responsibility. 
While the suggestion is attractive in that it may reduce the Court’s burden, Judge Sebutinde’s 
arguments would stand against such an approach. A fortiori if the suggestion made by Judge 
Gaja—that state responsibility for genocide should be assessed by reference to different 
standards than individual criminal responsibility—carries weight.
46
 Judge Gaja’s suggestion 
departs from the approach taken by the Court,
47
 but rightly calls attention to the difference in 
the focus of the two institutions.  
The most interesting suggestion came from Serbia, which argued that the Court need not 
accord greater weight to the findings of an ICTY Appeals Chamber than a Trial Chamber. It 
claimed that the judges of the former chamber, appointed at random and varying from case to 
case, could not claim greater experience or authority than those of the latter. Thus, rather than 
regarding an Appeals Chamber’s overruling of a Trial Chamber as conclusive, the Court 
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should form its own view of the persuasiveness of the arguments accepted by each.
48
 The 
background to Serbia’s argument was the ICTY’s judgments in the Gotovina case, in which 
the Trial Chamber had unanimously convicted two Croatian Generals of participation in a 
joint criminal enterprise to commit crimes that constituted the actus reus of genocide.
49
 The 
Appeals Chamber had overturned these convictions by a majority of three to two.
50
 Serbia 
contended that the Court should take into account the fact that, counting across both 
Chambers, a greater number of judges were convinced of the guilt of the Croatian Generals. 
The Court rightly dismissed these arguments, noting that it was not for it to pronounce on the 
manner in which the Appeals Chambers were constituted and that it was bound to respect the 
hierarchy between the two chambers. To adopt Serbia’s suggestion would have been to 
overlook the judicial form of the ICTY altogether, a lapse of judicial comity on the part of the 
Court.  
A final thought to close with: a layperson reading the case may be struck by the parties’ ready 
utilization of their own awful deeds and intentions as arguments in favour of their case. 
Acknowledging claims of forced displacement and ethnic cleansing, they argued that, 
committed only in order to gain control over the territory, those acts did not disclose a 
genocidal intent.
51
 This was a sound argument in a context where the Court’s jurisdiction 
extended only to violations of the Genocide Convention. Nevertheless not only laypersons, 
but also lawyers must feel discomfort at the jurisdictional constraints that necessitate such 
fragmentary adjudications of responsibility as give bite to such arguments. That, indeed, is 
the message in the concluding paragraphs of both the judgment and the President’s separate 
opinion.
52
    
 
Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) 
The second judgment of 2015 concerns Chile’s preliminary objection to jurisdiction in the 
case brought against it by Bolivia.
53
 Bolivia’s application, instituted in April 2013, asked the 
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Court to find that Chile had violated an obligation ‘to negotiate in good faith and effectively 
with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the 
Pacific Ocean.’
54
 It requested the Court to order Chile to perform this obligation ‘in good 
faith, promptly, formally, within a reasonable time and effectively, to grant Bolivia a fully 
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.’
55
 The application invoked Article XXXI of the Pact 
of Bogotá
56
 as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Article XXXI provides for compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court in disputes concerning treaty interpretation, questions of 
international law, breaches of international obligation, and reparation. Chile’s preliminary 
objection, however, referred the Court to Article VI of the same Pact,
57
 which excludes 
recourse to Article XXXI in ‘matters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or 
… governed by agreements … in force on the date of the conclusion of the present Treaty.’ 
Chile contended that Bolivia’s request, effectively asking the Court to order Chile to make a 
specific territorial disposition, concerned a matter that had already been settled by a bilateral 
treaty concluded between the two states in 1904.
58
 Bolivia objected to this characterization of 
the dispute before the Court.  
The factual background to the application may briefly be reprised. Bolivia, land-locked 
between Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Peru, once had a coastline along the Pacific Ocean, 
which it lost following a war with Chile in the late 19
th
 century. In 1904, the two states signed 
a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, formalizing a comprehensive territorial settlement, under 
which Bolivia’s coastal territory became Chilean, while Bolivia was granted a right of 
commercial transit to Chilean ports.
59
 Bolivia remained desirous of regaining a sovereign 
access to the Pacific Ocean, and claims that for many years, Chile showed willingness to 
negotiate terms by which it could be achieved: Chile specifically committed itself ‘through 
agreements, diplomatic practice and a series of declarations attributable to its highest-level 
representatives, to negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia,’
60
 but retreated from 
this commitment in  February 2011, on the basis that ‘Bolivia lacks any legal basis to access 
the Pacific through territories appertaining to Chile’.
61
 Bolivia claimed that its application 
was not concerned with the terms of the 1904 treaty, but with Chile’s actions thereafter that 
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gave rise to an obligation to negotiate in good faith with Bolivia in order to secure to it a 
sovereign access to the sea.  
The Court considered the main issue in contention was the appropriate characterization of the 
dispute: was it merely concerned with Chile’s alleged obligation to negotiate, as Bolivia 
contended; or did it seek a finding that Chile was obliged to agree to a particular territorial 
outcome, as Chile contended? Once it settled this question, it could determine whether or not 
the dispute was a matter excluded by Article VI of the Pact of Bogotá.  
Thus addressing the proper characterization of the dispute first, the Court found that Bolivia’s 
application merely concerned the existence of an obligation upon Chile to negotiate with 
Bolivia. It dismissed Chile’s argument that the relief sought by Bolivia entailed a finding not 
only of an obligation of conduct on part of Chile, but also an obligation of result.
62
 Chile had 
argued that Bolivia had presented its claims in terms that suggested that a cession of territory 
by Chile was already a given; only the details—how much territory, and where—remained to 
be negotiated.
63
 And this, it had insisted, was contrary to the 1904 Treaty which had finalised 
the territorial rights of both states; Bolivia could not reopen that discussion via an approach to 
the Court under the Pact of Bogotá.
64
 The Court, however, considered that it would not be 
called upon to predetermine the outcome of a negotiation even if it were to find for Chile’s 
obligation to negotiate. It described the subject-matter of the dispute as being ‘whether Chile 
is obligated to negotiate in good faith Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and, if 
such an obligation exists, whether Chile has breached it.’
65
 It found that the 1904 treaty did 
not exclude the Court’s jurisdiction.  
The Court’s description of the subject-matter of the dispute subtly rewords the relief sought 
in Bolivia’s application, which had been for a declaration that Chile had (breached) the 
obligation to negotiate ‘in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign 
access to the Pacific Ocean’ (suggesting an obligation of result).
66
  The formulation in the 
judgment may be read as signifying that the declaration sought was simply that Chile was 
obligated to negotiate in good faith the question of Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific 
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Ocean. That is, an obligation of conduct. The Court here was perhaps influenced by Bolivia’s 
own implicit reformulation of its claim in these terms in the oral proceedings.
67
  
The question that follows is whether by this characterization, the Court has implicitly limited 
its own hand as to its possible findings on the merits. That is, is it now precluded from 
finding that the content of any obligation to negotiate on Chile’s part includes the obligation 
to achieve a specific result? This is an important point, for as the Court notes, at the merits 
stage Bolivia will adduce evidence of Chilean practice that establishes its duty to negotiate.
68
 
It is plausible that Bolivia will argue that this practice further evinces a recognition of the 
duty to provide for a certain outcome—Bolivia’s sovereign access. In fact, Bolivia asserted 
that the existence and specific content of the obligation to negotiate were matters to be 
determined by the Court.
69
 Has the Court restricted itself only to determining the former?  
Probably not. The judgment avoids accepting Chile’s contention that the 1904 treaty is the 
final word on the territorial rights and obligations of the two states. It simply finds that there 
is no occasion for it to examine that contention because the subject matter of the dispute is 
different. It emphasizes this in responding to Bolivia’s alternative argument that such a 
contention refutes Bolivia’s case on the merits, ‘and thus [does] not possess an exclusively 
preliminary character’.
70
 Ordinarily, considerations of judicial economy would imply that 
having accepted Bolivia’s principal argument, the Court need not address the alternative. 
Here, though, by doing so it reinforces that it has not spoken on the merits of Chile’s 
contention.  
Nevertheless, the Court has taken a convoluted route to settling the preliminary objection. 
Judge Gaja outlines a better approach, which would have been to find that Bolivia’s 
application articulates the possibility that a matter once considered settled by the 1904 Treaty 
was unsettled by subsequent practice occurring between 1905 and the conclusion of the 
Bogotá Protocol, and if so, was not excluded by Article VI of that Protocol.
71
 Whether these 
claims carry weight—that is, the matter was in fact unsettled, and to what extent—were 
issues bearing on the merits. Chile’s objection, therefore, lacked an exclusively preliminary 
character, and would be addressed alongside the merits. A simple order on joinder, 
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recommended in a number of individual opinions,
72
 would not only have had the charm of 
brevity, but also would have been in keeping with the likely tenor of the Court’s approach at 
the merits stage, where it will presumably evaluate the 1904 Treaty alongside other practice 
to determine the existence and content of Chile’s obligation to negotiate.  
A final point on the likely scope of the merits arguments. Bolivia claims it will prove that 
‘beyond its general obligations under international law, Chile has committed itself, more 
specifically’ to negotiate a sovereign access for Bolivia.
73
 Implicit here is the assertion that 
international law also imposes a general obligation to negotiate, binding upon Chile. Bolivia 
has not clarified the basis for this assertion; but if proved, it could avoid all difficulties of 
establishing Chile’s specific obligation. Is there a legal basis for such an obligation? There is 
no doctrine in the context of negotiating sovereign access (if that implies territorial control) 
that this author can readily call to mind.
74
 Eyal Benvenisti offers the interesting 
observation—applying the idea of sovereignty as trusteeship—that ‘[a] coastal state … must 
allow access to a landlocked neighbor if such access entails no harm to itself (for example, a 
one-time emergency flight over its airspace, or even a tunnel below its territory).’
75
 However, 
although Benvenisti has linked this argument to Bolivia’s claim against Chile, he does not 
refer to a duty to negotiate cession of territory.
76
 His measured tone, referring only to flight or 
tunnelling underground, rather confirms that under general international law Bolivia’s best 
claim would be for negotiation of the sort of transit rights that it already enjoys by 
arrangement with Chile.  
Proving Chile’s specific obligation to negotiate an enhanced access thus appears unavoidable 
for Bolivia, and indicates the probable focus of its merits arguments. For, securing a tract of 
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territory is surely the motivation underlying its application, though it may have disavowed 
this to win at the stage of preliminary objections.  
 
Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) and 
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica)  
The Court’s third judgment involved a frequent litigant, Nicaragua. In this instance, however, 
the joined cases between Nicaragua and Costa Rica did not serve as the occasion for a 
significant pronouncement on legal doctrine or principle. The disputes, which included 
claims of territorial infringement and transboundary environmental harm on both sides, 
mainly turned on the facts. The Court found in favour of Costa Rica’s claim of sovereignty 
over a disputed territory, and its violation by Nicaragua; and it found in favour of Nicaragua’s 
claim that Costa Rica failed to carry out a necessary environmental impact assessment 
(EIA).
77
 It dismissed Nicaragua’s claim of territorial infringement by Costa Rica, and Costa 
Rica’s claim that Nicaragua had not carried out a necessary EIA. The Court’s (perhaps 
excessive) regard for judicial economy led it to leave unexamined several other claims. The 
only other findings were of Nicaragua’s breaches of provisional measures, and of Costa 
Rica’s navigation rights.  
Given the complex factual backdrop to the joined cases, it may be helpful to first outline the 
facts together with the claims and findings, and then discuss some important points. Costa 
Rica’s claims against Nicaragua concerned its activities relating to the San Juan River.
78
 The 
river’s southern bank constitutes a major stretch of the boundary between the two states; its 
waters fall within Nicaraguan sovereignty, while Costa Rica enjoys rights of navigation on 
it.
79
 At a point close to the Caribbean coast the river divides into two branches. From here, 
the border runs along the right bank of the north-flowing branch, the Lower San Juan—
although until this judgment there was confusion as to whether the border and the river 
diverged in the very last mile or two. The reason for the confusion was that, due to natural 
geological modifications over time, the boundary line described in arbitral awards of the 19
th
 
century no longer exactly corresponded to the river’s flow. Nevertheless, the criterion 
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underlying that boundary line—that it should run along the right bank of the navigable 
channel of the river—was accepted by both parties. They disagreed, however, as to which 
channel was indicated: Costa Rica referred to the main river. Nicaragua referred to a channel 
to the right of the main river, that it claimed to have dredged (beginning in 2010) to restore to 
navigability.
80
 Costa Rica contended that Nicaragua had artificially created this channel in 
Costa Rican territory. 
Many of Costa Rica’s other claims flowed from this one. For, if the channel dug by 
Nicaragua was an artificial one, then (Costa Rica alleged) Nicaragua had indeed trespassed 
upon Costa Rica’s territory: it had violated Costa Rica’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
used the San Juan River to commit hostile acts (contrary to a specific obligation not to
81
); 
and, worse, had sent its military into that territory, breaching Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, 
and making that territory the object of a military occupation. Nicaragua claimed it was 
merely clearing an existing channel, which was the one that appropriately marked the 
boundary between the two states; hence no violation of territorial sovereignty or any other 
obligation was entailed. The Court, therefore, first pronounced upon the territorial dispute. 
Finding no evidence to support Nicaragua’s claim that the channel it was clearing was a 
natural one, the Court found in favour of Costa Rica’s assertion that its boundary line was 
determined by the right bank of the main river. Hence the disputed territory was Costa Rican; 
and Nicaragua was in breach of its obligation to respect Costa Rica’s sovereignty.   
The Court decided not to ‘dwell’ upon Costa Rica’s related submissions: it decided not to 
examine whether Nicaragua had breached Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, nor to pronounce 
upon whether Nicaragua’s actions constituted a military occupation.
82
 It found Costa Rica’s 
claim of the hostile use of the river unsupported by evidence.  
Costa Rica had also claimed that Nicaragua’s channelling and dredging activities violated 
applicable environmental law, including the obligations to conduct an EIA, notify and consult 
with Costa Rica, and not to cause harm to Costa Rica’s territory and protected wetlands. The 
Court observed that ‘general international law’ now imposes a requirement ‘to undertake an 
[EIA] where there is a risk that the proposed … activity may have a significant adverse 
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impact in a transboundary context’, quoting its judgment in Pulp Mills on the point.
83
 
However, it was satisfied on the facts that Nicaragua’s preliminary assessment had not 
revealed a risk of significant transboundary harm; and thus it was not required to carry out an 
EIA. Correspondingly, it had not breached its notice and consult obligations.
84
 The Court 
further found Costa Rica’s claim of actual environmental harm unsupported by evidence. It 
did not answer an interesting legal point raised by Nicaragua, which claimed under the terms 
of the 1888 Cleveland Award, it was entitled to carry out dredging even if this caused some 
environmental harm to Costa Rica, for this entitlement constituted a lex specialis to its 
general obligations under environmental law. The Court merely noted that there was no 
reason for it to decide on whether the development of the obligation not to cause 
transboundary harm had superseded the earlier regime (if indeed it corresponded to 
Nicaragua’s description), for no harm had been proven on the facts.  
Dismissing Costa Rica’s environmental claims, the Court made two other findings in its 
favour. First, on evidence not contested by Nicaragua, it found that Nicaraguan officials had 
breached Costa Rica’s navigational rights on two occasions. Second, Nicaragua was in breach 
of provisional measures indicated in 2011.
85
 The Court had asked both parties to refrain from 
maintaining military, police or civilian personnel in the disputed territory, and from any 
action that might exacerbate the dispute. Nicaragua had established a military presence and 
excavated two additional channels in the disputed territory, violating both parts of the order. 
On a point of principle, the Court also clarified that a judgment on merits was an appropriate 
place for the Court to assess compliance with provisional measures and to make a finding of 
responsibility for their breach (Nicaragua had suggested that such a finding would be 
redundant by this stage).  
However, it declined to awards the costs of the further proceeding on provisional measures 
(leading to an order in 2013
86
) that Costa Rica claimed had resulted directly from Nicaragua’s 
breach. The Court, which has not to this date awarded costs in any proceeding, decided to 
follow the general rule (in Article 64 of its Statute) that parties should bear their own costs. It 
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awarded other relief to Costa Rica, in the form of declarations of Nicaragua’s violations, and 
a finding that it was entitled to receive compensation for material damage caused to its 
territory.
87
 The Court asked the two states to negotiate the quantum of compensation amongst 
themselves, but has also provided for a judicial determination at the request of either, if they 
are unable to agree within twelve months.
88
 It declined to order assurances and guarantees of 
non-repetition, preferring to maintain its rather sparing recourse to these forms of reparation.  
Turning to Nicaragua’s claims against Costa Rica: these arose from Costa Rica’s construction 
of a major roadway along the right bank of the San Juan.
89
 The construction began in 
December 2010, and in early 2011, Costa Rica proclaimed a state of emergency on the San 
Juan border area, in the light of Nicaragua’s activities.  In response to Nicaragua’s claims as 
to breaches of applicable environmental law, it argued that the emergency exempted it from 
the obligation to conduct an EIA before beginning the construction. It further argued that it 
did carry out environmental impact studies during the construction, which fulfilled the 
requirement. It rejected Nicaragua’s further claim that its actions had caused transboundary 
harm.  
The Court offered a rather more elaborate response to Nicaragua’s environmental claims than 
it had to Costa Rica’s, although its fact-focused answers once again did not address some 
interesting legal points. It first found that the construction project did pose a risk of 
substantial transboundary harm, triggering the obligation to conduct an EIA. Moreover, Costa 
Rica had not established that it had conducted any preliminary assessment that suggested 
otherwise.  
It then addressed Costa Rica’s argument as to the effects of an emergency. Costa Rica had 
proposed two distinct bases for its claim that an emergency can exempt a State from the 
requirement to conduct an EIA: first, because international law contains a renvoi to domestic 
law on this point; and second, because international law includes an exemption for 
emergency situations. On the first, the Court found that its previous pronouncement that it 
was for each state ‘“to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for 
the project, the specific content of the EIA required in each case” having regard to various 
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factors’, did not extend to the question of whether an EIA should be undertaken.
90
 The 
international obligation to conduct an EIA was not affected by an emergency exception in 
domestic law. The Court did not address the second point, simply noting that the facts did not 
indicate the existence of an emergency necessitating the immediate construction of the road.  
It further found that Costa Rica’s impact studies did notfulfill the obligation to conduct an 
EIA, for that obligation required an ex ante evaluation of the risks of transboundary harm. 
Costa Rica was thus in breach. The Court did not pronounce on Nicaragua’s related claims as 
to Costa Rica’s failure to notify and consult with Nicaragua, perhaps again as a matter of 
judicial economy.
91
 It found that Costa Rica’s actions had not caused significant 
transboundary harm, and dismissed as unfounded a standard of evaluation proposed by 
Nicaragua -- that any detrimental impact capable of being measured would constitute 
significant harm.  
Finally, the Court also dismissed Nicaragua’s claim that Costa Rica’s construction had led to 
the creation of deltas in the river that amounted to ‘physical invasions, incursions by Costa 
Rica into Nicaragua’s sovereign territory . . . through the agency of sediment’.
92
 It described 
the ‘theory’ of territorial infringement via sediment as unconvincing; and in any event 
unsupported by the facts.
93
 Thus, finding in Nicaragua’s favour only in respect of the 
obligation to conduct an EIA, the Court awarded it declaratory relief on this point and 
dismissed its other requests for reparation.    
What, then, to take from the above summary of the facts, arguments and findings in the 
joined cases? Perhaps most striking is the Court’s embrace of judicial economy, particularly 
in not deciding on Costa Rica’s claim of the use of force by Nicaragua. This was a serious 
allegation, involving, at an extreme, the breach of a peremptory norm. While the Court has 
long asserted a ‘freedom to select the ground upon which it will base its judgement’,
94
 it is 
not self-evident that a selection is appropriate between claims that represent rather different 
orders of responsibility. Selecting a claim involving a lower-order breach seems hardly 
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sufficient to vindicate the rights of a state that has suffered violation of a peremptory norm.
95
 
Yet the Court appeared to find it sufficient, for it based its explanation not even on the 
freedom to select (which, though problematic, is at least unfettered by criteria for 
application
96
), but on the statement that by its judgment and Nicaragua’s consequent 
evacuation, ‘the injury suffered by Costa Rica “will in all events have been sufficiently 
addressed”.’
97
 This approach, which the Court has also taken previously,
98
  is unsatisfactory. 
As Judge Robinson argues in a detailed opinion, the Court’s judicial function, as a UN organ, 
is to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, by way of peaceful 
settlement of international disputes.
99
 This entails that it must decide all non-frivolous claims 
of breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter that are asserted before it—both to clarify for all 
states the contours of that provision, regarded as the Charter’s ‘cornerstone’, and to determine 
the appropriate reparation owed to the injured state.
100
  Here, the Court’s approach subsumed 
Nicaragua’s breach of Article 2(4) under a lesser infringement, and denied Costa Rica the 
remedy of satisfaction for that breach.
101 
 
The Court’s decision not to pronounce upon the existence in international law of an 
emergency exception to the obligation to conduct an EIA is more understandable. For, in this 
instance, the Court first determined that the factual basis for the claim did not exist (unlike 
with respect to Costa Rica’s claims on Nicaragua’s use of force). Further consideration of an 
emergency exception would have been superfluous, and a pronouncement on its legal status 
an obiter dictum. Nevertheless, we might wish that the Court had made the pronouncement, 
given the importance of the issue and the paucity of legal writing upon it. Whether states may 
claim an emergency as the basis for exemption from legal obligations remains an area of 
uncertainty, on such issues as the scope of the exception, the norms to which it may be 
applied, the conduct permitted and, most importantly, who decides. The law has consolidated 
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around specific devices, such as rules on derogations from human rights obligations,
102
 and 
the defence of necessity formulated in the ASR,
103
 but it is not clear that such enumerated 
grounds exhaust the possibilities of invoking an emergency. At its heart, the question engages 
the perpetual debate on the proper relationship between sovereignty and international order, 
and the extent to which they accommodate each other. While the Court may not have offered 
any substantial contribution to this debate, it could have advanced our understanding on the 
applicability of an emergency exception to environmental obligations.
104
 In any event, the 
judgment confirms two things. First, the existence of an emergency exception in domestic 
law does not suffice to exempt a state from international legal obligations. And, second, the 




Some might choose to contrast the Court’s economical approach to arguments on the merits 
with its more expansive approach to admissibility, for it permitted two submissions by Costa 
Rica that had not formed part of its original application. One was on Nicaragua’s breaches of 
Costa Rica’s rights to navigation; which claim the Court rightly considered could be read into 
the general language of Costa Rica’s requested remedies. The second related to the question 
of who had sovereignty over the disputed territory, which was raised by Costa Rica only at 
the stage of the oral argument (but became the subject of the Court’s first operative 
conclusion). Judges Gevorgian and Guillaume argued that the Court should not have decided 
this issue, with Judge Guillaume in particular suggesting that the Court should have found 
Costa Rica’s submissions on this point inadmissible because they transformed the character 
of the dispute.
106
 However, the Court’s own view, that it needed to settle the territorial 
dispute in order to determine whether Nicaragua had incurred responsibility, is more 
persuasive. As such then, the Court’s approach to admissibility does not present any novel 
considerations.  
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But the Court’s decision not to award costs to Costa Rica does call for appraisal. And, it has 
been subjected to a critical one by several members of the Court. Judges Tomka, Greenwood, 
Sebutinde and Dugard argue in a joint declaration that the relief was merited. Costa Rica had 
claimed costs only for the proceeding on provisional measures necessitated by Nicaragua’s 
non-compliance with a previous Court order. The Court had found Nicaragua in breach, and 
the present judgment clarifies that Nicaragua owes compensation to Costa Rica for any 
damage caused by its breach. It seems incongruous that Costa Rica was then denied the 
opportunity to recover ‘what may well be the largest expense it was obliged to incur, namely 
the costs of nearly a week of hearings before the Court.’
107
 Given these facts, the Court 
should have appropriately offered an explanation for why costs should not be awarded. 
Instead, it offered only a rather ‘Delphic pronouncement’.
108
  
Finally, a word on the obligation to conduct an EIA. The judgment confirms that states do 
have the obligation where there is a risk of significant transboundary harm, and moreover that 
it stems from a broader due diligence obligation to prevent such harm. It also confirms, more 
or less, that the Court will evaluate for itself whether there was a risk of significant harm, 
based on the materials supplied by the parties: it does so with respect to claims against both 
parties. However, its standards for evaluation are less clear. In the case against Nicaragua, the 
Court relies on Nicaragua’s own study, which it finds confirmed by the experts produced by 
both parties. With almost no discussion, it states that it is satisfied that there was no risk of 
substantial harm. In the case against Costa Rica, in contrast, the judgment offers a more 
expanded discussion, outlining the considerations and factors that are relevant.
109
 The reason 
for this extended evaluation was perhaps its finding that Costa Rica had not conducted a 
preliminary risk assessment (which ‘is one of the ways in which a state can ascertain … a risk 
of significant transboundary harm’
110
). But the Court does not clarify if that is indeed its 
reason for the different treatment of the two claims, and whether that reason grounds a 
general approach. Nor does it clarify what would amount to a satisfactory preliminary 
assessment. The whole becomes particularly puzzling if we take on board Judge ad hoc 
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Dugard’s criticisms of Nicaragua’s risk assessment.
111
 To the extent that those are merited, it 
does not seem that Nicaragua had satisfactorily evaluated the degree of risk to Costa Rica’s 
environment. Why then is the Court persuaded? The judgment might have done more to 
clarify matters.  
The Court also introduces some uncertainty in relation to the obligation to notify and consult. 
As Judge Donoghue notes, the judgment uses language that appears to unduly narrow the 
scope of this obligation in suggesting that it arises only if the EIA confirms a risk of 
significant transboundary harm.
112
 But if the notice and consult obligation is part of a broader 
due diligence obligation to prevent transboundary harm, then there is no reason why it should 
not operate vis-à-vis a potential affected state even prior to the assessment of risk.
113
 The 
participation of such a state may well be indispensable for the proper conduct of a risk 
assessment.  
The Court’s approach as regards the content of the EIA, however, should be affirmed. It 
rightly leaves each state to determine this in light of the particular circumstances; stipulating 
more specific content could have amounted to over-prescription. Instead, a more detailed 
elaboration of the standards by which a state must determine whether to conduct an EIA in 
the first place would represent a better, and more modest intervention.  
 
II. CONCLUSION 
The judgments covered in this review add to the corpus of international law in incremental 
rather than fundamental ways. Croatia v. Serbia slightly expands the concept of genocide, 
elaborates the Court’s approach to evaluating evidence and clarifies the inapplicability of the 
Monetary Gold principle to extinct states. Moreover, it has opened the way for further 
assessment of the concept of state responsibility by succession, which may indeed catalyse 
doctrinal development. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua settles a territorial dispute, offers some 
clarification on the obligation to conduct an EIA and confirms that a domestic provision for 
emergencies cannot on its own qualify a state’s international obligations and that the Court 
will evaluate for itself whether there exists a state of emergency necessitating specific 
measures. It also confirms the Court’s reluctance to grant costs. Bolivia v. Chile did not 
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provide occasion even for small pronouncements; the most we might take away is the Court’s 
approach to characterizing the subject-matter of the dispute, and its reluctance to join Chile’s 
preliminary objection to the merits.  
The cases are perhaps most noteworthy in revealing the Court’s preference for judicial 
economy. In both Croatia v. Serbia and, especially, Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, the Court 
preferred first to make factual findings, in order to judge where pronouncements on the legal 
position were called for. The judgments are remarkable for the legal possibilities that were 
canvassed but not clarified for the lack of a factual necessity—responsibility by succession, 
Nicaragua’s use of force and the existence of an emergency exception in international law. 
The Court’s approach may be due to its focus ‘on deciding the case rather than developing 
the law’;
114
 certainly, the judgments determine significant claims (genocide, territorial rights), 
which must have held the Court’s attention. Nevertheless, in other cases the Court has offered 
more comprehensive discussion and influential obiter dicta.
115
 The election for judicial 
economy in the present cases, particularly where this entailed an abortive discussion of an 
unestablished doctrine (succession to responsibility), or omission to decide a claim of use of 
force, is thus not easily explained. Moreover, the Court also skated lightly over points upon 
which did not involve concerns of judicial economy, such as the criteria for evaluating the 
conduct of a preliminary risk assessment, criteria for giving weight to scientific evidence in 
relation to the finding of environmental risks and the basis for the decision not to award costs. 
Here, the Court’s omissions make it difficult to understand the reasons underlying its 
findings, which could impact their reception.
116
 They also deny states valuable guidance as to 
appropriate standards of conduct (such as in conducting a preliminary risk assessment).  
 In contrast, there are two aspects of the judgments which promote rather than constraining 
opportunities for a reasoned debate. Firstly, the Court’s generous approach to admissibility, 
allowing new arguments even at late stages (so long as they do not transform the character of 
the dispute), may be justified as ensuring that state parties have the chance to articulate all 
arguments in support of their positions. Secondly, the numerous separate opinions—by which 
individual judges may not only offer fuller explanations of the judgments, but may also serve 
as the Court’s interlocutors over time. Noteworthy examples of the latter role include Judge 
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Donoghue querying whether in Croatia v. Serbia the Court had faithfully applied its own 
stated standard of proof, Judge Tomka raising questions about its embrace of the succession 
thesis, Judge Gaja encouraging it to adopt a different standard for state responsibility for 
genocide than that applied to individual criminal responsibility, Judge Robinson’s elaborate 
discussion of its duty to pronounce upon violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, Judge 
ad hoc Dugard’s dissection of its assessment of Costa Rica and Nicaragua’s conduct in 
relation to their obligations to undertake EIAs, and his joint opinion with Judges Tomka, 
Greenwood, and Sebutinde, challenging the Court’s decision not to award costs to Costa Rica 
and calling attention to its failure to give reasons. Although commentators differ as to the 
proper role of separate opinions—with some cautioning against ‘judicial overkill’ resulting 
from too-inventive opinions—it is understood that they provide means for checking 
anomalies and elisions in the Court’s reasoning, and may nudge the development of 
international law in particular directions.
117
 The opinions mentioned above are all careful 
critiques of the Court’s judgments, which both highlight points for further consideration by 
scholars and may push the Court towards a more thorough discussion when a further 
opportunity arises.  
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